Case Summaries
[03/09]
Zia Trust Co. v. Montoya In an action for excessive force brought by family members of a man defendant-officer shot and killed while responding to a domestic disturbance, denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is affirmed where the court could not say that a van fifteen feet away, which according to the plaintiffs was clearly stuck on a pile of rocks, gave defendant probable cause to believe that there was a threat of serious physical harm to himself or others that would justify his use of force.
[03/09]
Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action claiming excessive force by defendants-officers, denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is affirmed where: 1) defendants failed to show as a matter of law that plaintiff's decedent did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; 2) the district court properly found that defendants failed to show as a matter of law that the emergency and exigency exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied; 3) defendants failed to show that there were no questions of fact regarding whether a security guard had apparent authority to consent and implied consent; and 4) the district court did not err in finding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether the officers intentionally or recklessly provoked a confrontation.
[03/09]
Redd v. Wright In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action arising out of plaintiff inmate's confinement in tuberculosis hold following his refusal to submit to tuberculosis testing, summary judgment for defendants is affirmed where: 1) prior precedent did not "clearly foreshadow" a holding that the testing policy, as applied in this case, violated plaintiff's Free Exercise rights; 2) it could not reasonably be said that defendants acted in violation of clearly established Eighth Amendment law by implementing the policy; and 3) it was not clearly established that plaintiff was entitled to some kind of notice that religious objectors could be exempt from the policy.
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[03/08]
Milavetz, Gallop & Milavetz, P.A. v. US In an action by a law firm seeking declaratory relief, arguing that plaintiff was not bound by the Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act's (BAPCPA) debt relief agency provisions and therefore could freely advise clients to incur additional debt and need not make the requisite disclosures in its advertisements, the Eighth Circuit's order rejecting the district court's conclusion that attorneys are not "debt relief agencies" under BAPCPA, upholding application of BAPCPA's disclosure requirements to attorneys, and finding BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) unconstitutional, is affirmed in part where: 1) attorneys who provided bankruptcy assistance to assisted persons were debt relief agencies under the BAPCPA; and 2) BAPCPA section 528's requirements were reasonably related to the government's interest in preventing consumer deception. However, the court of appeals' order is reversed in part where BAPCPA section 526(a)(4) prohibited a debt relief agency only from advising a debtor to incur more debt because the debtor was filing for bankruptcy, rather than for a valid purpose.
[03/02]
Pfizer v. Sup. Ct. In plaintiffs' action against Pfizer, the manufacturer of Listerine mouthwash, pursuant to the Unfair Competition Law (UCL) and False Advertising Law claiming that Pfizer marketed the mouthwash in a misleading manner by representing that the use of it can replace the use of dental floss in reducing plaque and gingivitis, defendant's petition for writ of mandate seeking to overturn an order certifying the class action is granted as the ruling certifying a class consisting of all persons who purchased Listerine in California during a six-month period is overbroad, and In re Tobacco II Cases, 46 Cal.4th 298 (2009), does not require a different disposition in this case.
[02/22]
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. Mktg. on Hold Inc. In an interlocutory appeal of a trial court's class certification order, where the class representative obtained assignments of claims that the defendant telephone company improperly charged some of its business customers certain municipal fees, the judgment of the court of appeals is reversed and the class decertified where: 1) the assignments are valid and provide standing; 2) the class representative's claims are typical of the other class members' claims; 3) common questions of law or fact predominate; but 4) the putative class representative failed to establish that it adequately represents the claim.
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[03/01]
Jones v. Unum Provident Corp. In an action under ERISA for wrongful denial of benefits, summary judgment for defendant is affirmed where: 1) defendant thoroughly investigated plaintiff's claim, both initially and when plaintiff appealed, and its initial and final decisions were carefully reasoned; and 2) coverage under the policy at issue lapsed more than six weeks prior to plaintiff's return to full-time work, and thus her later disability claim was not covered because of a pre-existing condition clause.
[02/26]
Overby v. Nat'l Ass'n of Letter Carriers In an action seeking a declaration that a purported amendment to a trust plan, which would have rendered plaintiff ineligible to receive benefits under the plan as a surviving spouse, was not properly adopted, judgment for plaintiffs is affirmed where the district court committed no reversible error in either its factual determinations or in its conclusions of law in finding that the trustees of the plan had not submitted the amendment to the fund's actuaries for an evaluation and estimate of its cost, as required by the governing provisions of the plan, and therefore the amendment was not properly adopted.
[02/25]
Carpenters Dist. Council v. JNL Const. Co. In an ERISA action on behalf of certain pension funds against a construction company claiming that defendants failed to contribute union employees' fringe benefits to the funds as required by collective bargaining agreements, summary judgment for plaintiffs is reversed where plaintiffs did not produce sufficient evidence to show the absence of trialworthy issues on the issue of whether defendant corporation was used to perpetrate a fraud.
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[03/09]
Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church & Sch. In an employment discrimination and retaliation action brought by a teacher at a religious school claiming violations of the ADA, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the defendant based on the "ministerial exception" is vacated and remanded as, given the factual findings relating to plaintiff's primary duties as a teacher, the district court erred in its legal conclusion classifying her as a ministerial employee.
[03/02]
Doe v. Kamehamema Schs./Bernice Pauahi Bishop Estate In a racial discrimination action against a school district in which plaintiffs, four minor children, sought to proceed anonymously in their suit, dismissal of the action is affirmed where the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow anonymity because the district court did not clearly err in its conclusion that plaintiffs did not reasonably fear severe harm.
[03/01]
San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist. v. Laidlaw Transit, Inc. In qui tam plaintiffs' suit seeking to recover funds on behalf of the San Francisco Unified School District under the California False Claims Act (CFCA), trial court's dismissal of the action is reversed as, under the CFCA, a vendor impliedly certifies that it complies with its express contractual requirements when it bills a public agency for providing goods and services, and allegations that the implied certification was false and had a natural tendency to influence the public agency's decision to pay for the goods or services are sufficient to survive a demurrer.
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[03/09]
Native Ecosystems Council v. Tidwell In an action challenging the Forest Service's approval of a project to update grazing allotments in the Beaverhead-Deerlodge National Forest, summary judgment for defendant is reversed where: 1) because the Forest Service's environmental assessment was based on a nonexistent management indicator species, its habitat proxy analysis was not reliable; and 2) the Forest Service failed to take the requisite "hard look" at the project as required by the National Environmental Policy Act.
[03/08]
Kane Cty. v. US In an appeal from the denial of plaintiffs' motion to intervene in an action brought by Kane County, Utah, to quiet title to several purported rights-of-way across federal public lands, the order is affirmed where: 1) even assuming plaintiffs had an interest in the quiet title proceedings at issue, plaintiffs failed to establish that the U.S. could not adequately represent plaintiffs' interest; and 2) the denial of permissive intervention was not arbitrary and capricious.
[03/08]
Morris v. US Nuclear Reg. Comm'n. In a petition for review of a license granted by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) to conduct in situ leach mining for uranium on four sites in northwest New Mexico, the petition is denied where: 1) the clear language of 10 C.F.R. section 20.1301(a)(1) supported the NRC's decision to focus only on the licensed operation; 2) the National Environmental Policy Act did not prohibit approval of projects with negative cumulative effects; it only required that the agency consider and disclose such effects; and 3) there was no evidence in the administrative record to support petitioners' assertion that the NRC based its adoption of the nine-pore-volume restoration effort on economic reasons.
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[03/09]
Zia Trust Co. v. Montoya In an action for excessive force brought by family members of a man defendant-officer shot and killed while responding to a domestic disturbance, denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is affirmed where the court could not say that a van fifteen feet away, which according to the plaintiffs was clearly stuck on a pile of rocks, gave defendant probable cause to believe that there was a threat of serious physical harm to himself or others that would justify his use of force.
[03/09]
Espinosa v. City & County of San Francisco In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action claiming excessive force by defendants-officers, denial of summary judgment based on qualified immunity is affirmed where: 1) defendants failed to show as a matter of law that plaintiff's decedent did not have a reasonable expectation of privacy; 2) the district court properly found that defendants failed to show as a matter of law that the emergency and exigency exceptions to the Fourth Amendment warrant requirement applied; 3) defendants failed to show that there were no questions of fact regarding whether a security guard had apparent authority to consent and implied consent; and 4) the district court did not err in finding that there were genuine issues of fact regarding whether the officers intentionally or recklessly provoked a confrontation.
[03/05]
Doe v. S. Carolina Dep't of Soc. Servs. In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 action brought by a minor child and her adoptive parents against defendant, an Adoption Specialist with the South Carolina Department of Social Services (SCDSS), alleging violations of their substantive due process rights under the Fourteenth Amendment and state law claims against SCDSS under the South Carolina Tort Claims Act (SCTCA), judgment is affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded where: 1) when a state involuntarily removes a child from her home, thereby taking the child into its custody and care, the state has taken an affirmative act to restrain the child's liberty, triggering the protections of the Due Process Clause and imposing "some responsibility for the child's safety and general well being"; 2) because it would not have been apparent to a reasonable social worker in defendant's position that her actions violated the Fourteenth Amendment, she is entitled to qualified immunity; 3) prospective adoptive parents have no substantive due process right to the disclosure of a child's history of sexual abuse; and 4) district court's grant of defendants' motion for summary judgment on the state law claims for gross negligence against SCDSS is vacated and remanded for consideration of the applicability of section 15-78-60(25).
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[03/09]
George's Inc. v. Allianz Global Risks US Ins. Co. In an action against an insurer claiming that defendant failed to indemnify plaintiff for business expenses and personal property losses as required under the terms of its insurance policy, partial summary judgment for defendant on the personal property claim is affirmed, but a partial denial of summary judgment on the business expenses claim is reversed where the policy unambiguously excludes coverage for plaintiff's claimed losses.
[03/09]
HealthEast Bethesda Hosp. v. United Commercial Travelers of Am. In an action for breach of an insurance settlement contract, summary judgment for plaintiff is affirmed where: 1) defendant was not an unsophisticated party because it had significant experience in handling and negotiating claims with healthcare providers; 2) because defendant bore the risk of mistake, the district court properly denied rescission based on unilateral mistake; and 3) the record of inaction by defendant strongly supported the denial of relief under both unilateral and mutual mistake.
[03/03]
City of Laguna Beach v. California Ins. Guarantee Ass'n In a city's action against an insurance company seeking reimbursement for incurring workers' compensation liability that exceeded its self-insured retention, grant of insurance company's motion for summary judgment is affirmed where: 1) the addition of subdivision (c)(13) to Ins. Code section 1063.1 did not abrogate Denny's Inc. v. Workers' Comp. Appeals Bd., 104 Cal.App.4th 1433 (2003); 2) the trial court properly invoked the Denny's rule when it granted summary judgment and concluded that the city cannot obtain reimbursement from defendant under section 1063.1(c)(13) as, although this provision renders the obligation of an insolvent excess workers' compensation insurer a "covered claim" that defendant must ordinarily reimburse, defendant need not reimburse a permissibly self-insured employer for benefits paid to an employee for cumulative injury if the employer's liability is based in part on a period of time when the employer was self-insured and chose not to buy excess insurance for the particular risk.
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[03/04]
Aills v. Boemi In plaintiff's medical malpractice suit against defendant plastic surgeon arising out of negligence in connection with an elective surgical procedure for breast reconstruction, the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeal is quashed and remanded as the district court erred in reversing for a new trial on the basis of an improper argument by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument.
[03/03]
Willis v. Bender In an action for lack of informed consent and medical malpractice, judgment for defendant is affirmed in part where there was no evidence, specifically expert testimony, that another physician was negligent and therefore no basis to hold defendant liable for his negligence. However, the judgment is reversed in part where defendant's alleged misrepresentations to plaintiff in response to her direct questions allegedly induced her to consent to the surgery and its risks, and under those circumstances, if proved, her consent could hardly be considered "informed".
[03/03]
Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman In an appeal involving defendants' anti-SLAPP special motion to strike (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16) plaintiff-former client's suit for various causes of action including breach of fiduciary duty, arising from defendants' prior representation in connection with plaintiff's efforts to redevelop real estate it owned in Beverly Hills, trial court's conclusion that section 425.16 did not apply because the gravamen of the action was breach of an attorney's duties of loyalty and confidentiality is reversed as all causes of action in the complaint arose from acts in furtherance of protected activity, and plaintiff could not show a probability of prevailing at trial.
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[03/04]
Aills v. Boemi In plaintiff's medical malpractice suit against defendant plastic surgeon arising out of negligence in connection with an elective surgical procedure for breast reconstruction, the judgment of the Second District Court of Appeal is quashed and remanded as the district court erred in reversing for a new trial on the basis of an improper argument by plaintiff's counsel during closing argument.
[03/03]
Willis v. Bender In an action for lack of informed consent and medical malpractice, judgment for defendant is affirmed in part where there was no evidence, specifically expert testimony, that another physician was negligent and therefore no basis to hold defendant liable for his negligence. However, the judgment is reversed in part where defendant's alleged misrepresentations to plaintiff in response to her direct questions allegedly induced her to consent to the surgery and its risks, and under those circumstances, if proved, her consent could hardly be considered "informed".
[03/03]
Oasis W. Realty, LLC v. Goldman In an appeal involving defendants' anti-SLAPP special motion to strike (Code of Civil Procedure section 425.16) plaintiff-former client's suit for various causes of action including breach of fiduciary duty, arising from defendants' prior representation in connection with plaintiff's efforts to redevelop real estate it owned in Beverly Hills, trial court's conclusion that section 425.16 did not apply because the gravamen of the action was breach of an attorney's duties of loyalty and confidentiality is reversed as all causes of action in the complaint arose from acts in furtherance of protected activity, and plaintiff could not show a probability of prevailing at trial.
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[03/08]
People ex rel. Reisig v. Acuna In an action initiated by the district attorney against the Broderick Boys, an alleged criminal street gang, and 23 of its members to enjoin as a public nuisance their activities in a 2.98-square mile area of West Sacramento, grant of district attorney's motion for a preliminary injunction is affirmed in part and reversed in part where: 1) sufficient and credible evidence supports the trial court's conclusion that the Broderick Boys is a criminal street gang whose activities have created a public nuisance in the designated area; and 2) two provisions in the injunction, one dealing with controlled substances and the other dealing with the consumption of alcoholic beverages, are unenforceable.
[03/04]
Tivo Inc. v. Echostar Corp. In a patent infringement action against EchoStar, relating to the software component of plaintiff's patent that allows television users to simultaneously record and play broadcasts using what is commonly known as a digital video recorder (DVR), district court's decision finding defendants in contempt of a permanent injunction is affirmed where: 1) the district court did not abuse its discretion in its decision to hold contempt proceedings; 2) there was clear and convincing evidence before the district court to find that both types of EchoStar receivers continue to infringe and that it was not an abuse of discretion for the ocurt to find EchoStar in contempt of the infringement provision; and 3) given defendant's refusal to disable the DVR functionality in its existing devices and the fact that its original attempts to design around TiVo's patent were wholly unsuccessful, the district court had ample justification for its determination that court pre-approval of any new design-around effort was necessary to prevent future infringing activity.
[03/04]
Nickey Gregory Co., LLC v. AgriCap, LLC In plaintiffs' action under the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), to recover from the defendant's finance company $106,696 owed them for the sale of produce to the defendant, judgment of the district court is affirmed in part, vacated in part and remanded where: 1) the district court correctly concluded that defendant's accounts receivable were held by the finance company as collateral for a loan and therefore were subject to a PACA trust; 2) district court properly rejected the finance company's BFP defense; and 3) district court's damage award is vacated and remanded to award commodities sellers the full amount of their unpaid balance.
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[03/01]
Media Techs. Licensing, LLC. v. Upper Deck Co. In a patent infringement suit involving patents related to memorabilia cards, district court's conclusion that the patents are invalid for obviousness is affirmed where: 1) defendants have met the burden of showing that it would have been obvious to one skilled in the art to attach a sports-related item instead of those items attached in the prior art references; and 2) secondary objective evidence also fails to establish non-obviousness.
[02/12]
Galveston Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Jaco In plaintiff's action against a school district under the Texas Whistleblower Act, claiming that he was demoted from his position as a director of athletics and extracurricular activities for reporting a student's violations of the University Interscholastic League's (UIL) eligibility rules to officials, trial court's denial of defendant's motion for dismissal for lack of jurisdiction is reversed and remanded as the elements of Tex. Gov Code section 554.002(a) can be considered to determine both jurisdiction and liability, and thus, whether the reporting of a violation of UIL rules and regulations to the UIL is a good-faith report of a violation of law to an appropriate law-enforcement authority is a jurisdictional question.
[02/08]
Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. In a 42 U.S.C. section 1983 and Title IX action against a university arising after the university required women on the co-ed wrestling team to compete against men under men's rules, summary judgment for defendants is reversed where: 1) plaintiffs were not required to give the university notice of, and an opportunity to rectify, the specific violation to make out a Title IX claim; 2) the record did not contain undisputed facts showing a history and continuing practice of program expansion that was responsive to women's interests; and 3) as plaintiffs were students and therefore subject to the policy that allegedly discriminated on the basis of sex at the time they filed their complaint, their section 1983 claim was not time-barred.
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